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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah 
and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) . The Utah Court of 
Appeals has no original appellate jurisdiction from the District 
Courts under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2). The Supreme Court has 
exercised its discretion to transfer this case to the Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) and the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the trial court violated Plaintiffs' substantive 
due process rights when it failed to analyze the relevant elements 
to determine whether to dismiss Plaintiffs' cause of action with 
prejudice. The appellate court reviews the decision of the trial 
court as a question of law and gives no deference to the decision 
of the trial court, reviewing for correctness. State v. Vijil, 784 
P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1988). 
II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
dismissing Plaintiffs7 cause of action for failure to prosecute. 
A trial court's determination to dismiss for failure to prosecute 
is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Hartford 
Leasing Co. v. State, 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1994) . An appellate 
court will not interfere with the trial court's decision unless the 
trial court abused its discretion and there is a likelihood that 
prejudice has occurred. Charlie Brown Construction Co. v. Leisure 
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Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987); Department of Social 
Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1980). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendants to 
immediately regain possession of Plaintiffs7 accounting records 
which were inappropriately held by Defendants. Plaintiffs also 
alleged tortious interference with business relationship, damage to 
Plaintiffs' ongoing businesses because of the deprivation of the 
records, accounting malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
punitive damages. Defendants' Answer alleged that the records had 
been returned pursuant to an agreement between counsel and denied 
the other allegations. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Discovery was undertaken and several attorneys made 
appearances for both parties. A motion by Plaintiffs to 
consolidate this action with another pending action common to the 
parties was denied. Plaintiffs designated their expert and lay 
witnesses pursuant to the Scheduling Order of May 19, 1993. 
Defendants failed to designate any witnesses. Plaintiffs filed a 
motion to amend their complaint, which motion remains outstanding. 
Trial was set for January 4, 1993, but later stricken by consent of 
the parties and the judge. 
A scheduling conference, held September 27, 1994, was 
continued without date by the court on the stipulation of the 
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parties. At this scheduling conference, Roger Sandack, attorney 
for Defendants, indicated that he would likely withdraw. Judge 
Rokich determined that it would be inappropriate to enter a 
scheduling order when counsel for Defendants was changing. Judge 
Rokich indicated that he would take no further action on the case 
until substitute counsel was named. 
Substitute counsel for Defendants made his appearance on May 
31, 1995, and filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice under Rule 
41(b) along with his Notice of Appearance. Plaintiffs responded to 
the Motion to Dismiss and after hearings, memoranda, and 
objections, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was granted. Roger 
Sandack did not withdraw until July 3, 1995. 
C. Disposition of the Trial Court 
The Trial Court, the Honorable William B. Bohling, District 
Judge, presiding, granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on October 
23, 1995, and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
the same date. Notice of Appeal was filed on November 20, 1995 and 
the Docketing Statement was filed on December 11, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On June 9, 1993, a scheduling hearing was conducted by the 
Honorable John A. Rokich. R. 91. At that hearing, Judge Rokich 
scheduled a pre-trial conference for November 30, 1993, scheduled 
a five day trial beginning January 4, 1994, and set the deadlines 
for designating expert and lay witnesses. R. 92. Plaintiffs filed 
their designation of expert witnesses on August 27, 1993, R. 98-9, 
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and named their lay witnesses on September 30, 1993. R. 100-03. 
Defendants filed no list of witnesses. 
Between the June 9, 1993 Scheduling Conference and the 
November 30, 1993 Pre-trial Conference, Plaintiffs undertook 
discovery, issued subpoenas, and took record depositions. R.105-
116. On November 17, 1993, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the 
Complaint, R. 117, an Amended Complaint, R. 118, and a Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Amend the 
Complaint. R. 127-128. At the November 30, 1993 Pre-trial 
Conference, Judge Rokich and counsel for the parties agreed that 
the trial scheduled for January 4, 1994 should be stricken and 
continued without date. R. 147. 
A scheduling conference was held on September 27, 1994. At 
that hearing Defendant's attorney, Roger Sandack, informed the 
court that he would withdraw as counsel for Defendants. Affidavit 
of Judge Rokich, R. 306-07, Addendum 3. Judge Rokich continued the 
scheduling conference, without date, so that Mr. Sandack could be 
replaced without jeopardizing any scheduling established by the 
court. Id. Based on the disclosures of Mr. Sandack, Judge Rokich 
determined that it would be inappropriate to enter a scheduling 
order when Defense counsel was changing. JEd. Judge Rokich 
intended to enter a scheduling order only after Defendant's new 
counsel had been designated. Id. He also intended to take no 
further action in relation to this case until substitute counsel 
for Defendants made an appearance. Id. Judge Rokich retired and 
his caseload was assumed by Judge Bohling. 
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On June 2, 1995, Defendant's new counsel, Michael L. Deamer, 
simultaneously filed his Notice of Entry of Appearance of Counsel, 
R. 183-84, and Notice to Dismiss with Prejudice Under Rule 41(b). 
R. 185-86. Roger Sandack withdrew as counsel for Defendants on 
July 3, 1995. R. 248-9. Judge Bohling heard arguments on the 
Motion to Dismiss on August 14, 1995, R. 334-41, and October 23, 
1995, R. 342-53, and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, R. 317-20, and entered an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice on 
October 23, 1995. R. 321-23. The Notice of Appeal was filed 
November 20, 1995. R. 328-29. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Due process is a constitutionally guaranteed protection for 
all citizens. Procedural due process requires that every 
individual receive notice and an opportunity for a hearing on all 
pending issues. Substantive due process requires judges to 
consider relevant factors in reaching their decisions, thus 
protecting against arbitrariness and abuses of discretion. The 
trial court failed to consider the relevant factors in making its 
decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' cause of action with prejudice, 
focusing only on the actions of Plaintiffs, rather than on the 
actions of both parties and the prejudice resulting from a 
dismissal. The appropriate exercise of discretion requires the 
disciplined examination of the relevant factors, weighted in 
conjunction with each other. Having failed to consider the 
relevant factors, Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights have 
been violated, and the case should be reversed and remanded to the 
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trial court. 
Westinahouse sets forth five specific considerations that must 
be reviewed by the court before ruling on a motion to dismiss. 
These considerations are (1) the conduct of both parties, (2) the 
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward, (3) what 
each party did to move the case forward, (4) what difficulty or 
prejudice was caused to the opposing party, and most importantly, 
(5) whether injustice may result from the dismissal. The trial 
court failed to consider these elements before dismissing 
Plaintiffs cause of action, which constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. 
An additional factor in Westinghouse requires a "justifiable 
excuse" for the delay. On November 30, 1993, the Defendants 
requested that the trial be continued, the parties agreed to 
continuance, and Judge Rokich gave his blessing. At the September 
27, 1994 scheduling conference, Defendants informed the court that 
their counsel would withdraw and they would name substitute 
counsel. Judge Rokich ruled that no action would be taken on the 
case until Defendants named their successor attorney. Defendants 
chose to wait nine months before designating their new counsel. 
Defendants, therefore, directly caused or consented to delays of 
over 19 months. The Defendants' actions constitute the justifiable 
excuse for the actions of Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs adhered to the court's scheduling order by 
designating its witnesses. Defendants never designated any 
witnesses. Plaintiffs conducted discovery, held records 
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depositions, issued subpoenas duces tecum, and filed a Motion to 
Amend Complaint. Defendants did nothing to move the case forward 
and now complain of the delay that they themselves created. The 
totality of the circumstances justify the reversal of the 
dismissal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS SUBSTANTIVE 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY NOT ANALYZING 
EACH ELEMENT OF THE APPLICABLE STANDARD BEFORE 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF ACTION WITH PREJUDICE 
Article 1, §11 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this state, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
This provision is commonly referred to as the "open courts 
provision", which guarantees the citizens of Utah access to the 
courts of this State and a judicial procedure that is based on 
fairness and equality. See, Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 
P.2d 670 (Utah 1995) . Judicial interpretation of the open courts 
provision finds that it embodies substantive due process rights and 
freedom from arbitrary judicial rulings that deprive individual 
claimants of the right of access to the courts. See, Lee v. 
Gaufin, 867 P. 2d 572 (Utah 1993) (Justice Zimmerman concurring 
opinion). While most due process cases concern the procedural due 
process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard, 
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substantive due process concerns the content of the rules that 
specify when a right can be lost or impaired. Wells v. Children's 
Aid Soc. 681 P. 2d 199 (Utah 1984) . Questions that trigger 
substantive due process concerns can arise in the context of a 
hearing where the procedural formalities of notice and opportunity 
to be heard are observed but the ultimate decision is arbitrary, 
capricious or fundamentally unfair. See, State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 
1041, 1948 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . As this court observed in Parker: 
. . . While notice and an opportunity to be heard 
must be observed in order to meet the requirements of 
procedural due process, . . . the opportunity to be 
fairly heard is just one of the requisites of due 
process. . . . By limiting due process protection to 
simply notice and a hearing, the dissent construes the 
concept of due process too narrowly. "The purpose of due 
process is to prevent fundamental unfairness." . . . 
Furthermore, although seldom utilized, 
11
 [s]ubstantive due process guarantees that no person 
shall be deprived of property for arbitrary 
reasons." [citations omitted] 
As recognized in Utah, the open courts provision and the 
concept of substantive due process embodied therein protects 
claimants against arbitrary government action whether that action 
is taken by the legislature or the judiciary. See, Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp. , Ill P. 2d at 670, 675 ("Both [section 11 and the due 
process cause of Article 1, Section 7] act to restrict the powers 
of both the courts and the legislature.") Arbitrary judicial 
action may occur when the courts fail to follow their precedent and 
standards in rendering their decisions. Precedent creates 
substantive law and the failure of the trial court to consider the 
factors set forth in the substantive law allows arbitrary and 
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capricious decisions. To avoid an arbitrary decision, this Court 
reviews the dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute by the 
"abuse of discretion" standard. 
The abuse of discretion standard focuses on the way courts 
analyze and render their decisions. The cases that examine the 
abuse of discretion standard uniformly require that courts analyze 
the relevant factors before a decision is rendered. In the area of 
alimony, this Court in Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 550 (Utah 
App. 1993), stated: 
[T]hree factors . . . must be 
considered in fixing a reasonable alimony 
award: 
[1] the financial conditions and needs of 
the [spouse seeking support]; 
[2] the ability of the [spouse seeking 
support] to produce a sufficient income for 
[himself or] herself; and 
[3] the ability of the [payor spouse] to 
provide support. 
Jones Tv. Jones1, 700 P.2d [1072,] 1075 [(Utah 1985)]. 
"Failure to consider the Jones factors in fashioning 
an alimony award constitutes an abuse of discretion." 
Bell fv. Belli. 810 P.2d [489,] 492 [(Utah App. 
1991)](citations omitted) Thus, "the trial court must 
make sufficiently detailed findings on each factor to 
enable a reviewing court to ensure that the trial 
court/s discretionary determination was rationally based 
upon" the three Jones factors. Id. (citations omitted). 
"If sufficient findings are not made/ we must reverse 
unless the record is clear and uncontroverted such as to 
allow us to apply the Jones factors as a matter of law on 
appeal." Id. (Citation omitted)[Emphasis added]. 
The pertinent factors must be considered by the trial court before 
a decision can be rendered. Failure to consider the relevant 
factors as set forth in the appellate opinions is an abuse of 
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discretion. The trial court's findings must be sufficiently-
detailed on each factor to ensure that its determination is based 
upon the analysis of relevant factors. If sufficient findings are 
not made, the case must be reversed and remanded. 
Analyzing the relevant factors before rendering a decision is 
the protection against arbitrary and capricious decisions and the 
guarantee of effective review. If a court fails to consider the 
relevant factors and make detailed findings based on those factors, 
the appellate court cannot review the trial court's decision and 
the case must be reversed and remanded. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988) stated: 
[W] e hold that if reasonable fees are 
recoverable by contract or statute and the trial court 
considers all pertinent factors and determines in the 
exercise of its sound discretion that a specific sum is 
a reasonable fee, it is a mistake of law to award less 
than that amount. Stated another way, the trial court 
has broad discretion in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable fee, and we will consider that determination 
against an abuse-of-discretion standard. However, once 
the trial court makes that determination in the exercise 
of its sound discretion, it commits legal error if it 
awards less than the reasonable fee to which the 
successful litigant is entitled. 
. . . Such an award would constitute an abuse of 
discretion because the factors mentioned by the trial 
court in discounting the fee, as outlined by Justice 
Howe, are without support in the record or are otherwise 
inappropriate. [Emphasis added]. 
Regardless of the decision being made, the pertinent factors must 
be considered for the court to exercise its sound discretion. If 
the judgment is based upon factors not supported in the record or 
inappropriately considered, the court has abused its discretion. 
In the criminal law, sentencing requires the court to balance 
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the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before sentencing 
a convict. In State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 
1993), this Court stated: 
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless 
the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to 
consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a 
sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits. . . . 
[T]he supreme court stated that an "abuse of discretion 
may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing 
were 'inherently unfair' or if the judge imposed a 
'clearly excessive' sentence. [Emphasis added]. 
Failure of the trial court to consider all legally relevant factors 
constitutes an abuse of discretion and requires reversal of that 
court's decision. 
In Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather. 605 P.2d 1240 
(Utah 1980), the Supreme Court stated: 
The general rule which this Court follows is the 
judgment of the trial court will not be reversed unless 
it is shown the discretion exercised has been abused. In 
arriving at his conclusion the trial judge considered 
several factors relevant to the amount and composition of 
the jury award. The trial court's decision was not 
arbitrary or capricious and, therefore, this Court will 
not alter it. 
The trial court's decision in Ute-Cal was not arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion because the court considered 
the relevant factors before making its decision. 
In the context of the present case, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that the trial court's discretion in dismissing a pending 
action must be balanced against the higher priority of affording a 
claimant an opportunity to be heard and the need to do justice. 
See, Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul Larsen Contractor. 
Inc. , 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) . In Westinghouse, the Court 
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stated that there is more to consider in determining if a dismissal 
for failure to prosecute is proper than merely the amount of time 
elapsed since the suit was filed. Id. at 879. Those additional 
factors include; (1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the 
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; (3) what 
each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) what 
difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other side; and 
(5) most important, whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal. Id. 
The Findings and Conclusions entered by the trial court 
evidence that the decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint was 
based exclusively upon the court's determination that the 
Plaintiffs had not pressed forward with the prosecution of the 
case. In addition to the trial court's failure to analyze the 
facts against the Westinghouse factors, the trial court's myopic 
focus upon the Plaintiffs' actions constitutes a violation of 
Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights because it failed to 
even consider the factors necessary to render a decision. Having 
failed to consider the Westinghouse factors, the trial court's 
decision is a clear abuse of discretion. The trial court's refusal 
to consider the actions of the Defendants, including their request 
and consent to the continuation of the trial and failure to name 
replacement counsel for nine months, renders its decision contrary 
to both the Westinghouse directive and any general notion of 
fundamental fairness. 
This case was scheduled for trial on January 4, 1994. R. 91. 
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At the November 30, 1993 Pretrial Hearing, Defendants sought a 
continuance because they were unprepared to go forward with the 
trial. The trial was continued without date. At the September 27, 
1994 Scheduling Conference, Defendants' attorney, Roger Sandack 
represented that he would be replaced by subsequent counsel and 
therefore, would not be Defendants7 trial counsel. But for the 
actions of Defendants, this case would have been tried before Judge 
Rokich in January, 1994. The trial court ignored Defendants' 
conduct and the delay of almost nineteen months it caused. Rather 
than focus on the factors necessary in deciding a motion to 
dismiss: the conduct of both parties, the opportunity of each party 
to move the case forward, the actions taken by each party to move 
the case forward, and the prejudice to each party, as required by 
Westinahouse, the trial court focused exclusively upon the actions 
of Plaintiffs. In so doing, the court breached Plaintiffs7 
substantive due process rights. The trial court's refusal to 
consider and weigh the Defendants7 contribution to the delay in 
prosecution of this case constitutes a failure to adequately 
consider material, relevant factors and causes the trial court's 
exercise of discretion to be arbitrary and capricious. See, Ute-
Cal Land Development Corp. v. Satherf 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980). 
As previously stated by the Utah Supreme Court, the clear 
language of Article 1, §11 and the substantive due process rights 
embodied therein guarantee access to the courts and a judicial 
procedure that is based on fairness and equality. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp. . 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985) . The factors set 
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forth in Westinghouse reflect this same concern for equality in the 
court's consideration of each parties' conduct in relation to 
judicial delays. The trial court's single minded focus upon the 
actions of the Plaintiffs arbitrarily conflicts with the 
Westinghouse directive and the due process considerations embodied 
in Section 11. Therefore, the trial court's decision to dismiss 
Plaintiffs' case constitutes an arbitrary decision rendered in 
violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional due process rights. The 
trial court's decision, therefore, should be reversed and remanded. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' ACTION WHEN THE COURT 
FAILED TO APPLY THE WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD 
The trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims with 
prejudice without specifically considering necessary elements in 
making that decision. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
fail to address any of the specific requirements the trial court 
must consider in acting upon the issue. The court ignored the 
relevant factors which are elemental to the ruling of dismissal, 
which are set forth in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and interpreted in Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). The Westinghouse 
elements are set forth in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah 
App. 1989), as follows: 
A court's discretion, however, must be balanced 
against a higher priority: to "afford disputants an 
opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them." 
Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 544 P.2d [876] at 879. 
Thus, there is more to consider in determining if a 
dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper than merely 
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the amount of time elapsed since the suit was filed. Id. 
The factors which we consider may include the following: 
(1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each 
party has had to move the case forward; (3) what each of 
the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) what 
difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other 
side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may 
result from the dismissal. K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean, 656 
P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 1982); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 
P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977). [Emphasis added]. 
A fair analysis of these criteria and the facts, especially the 
Affidavit of Judge John A. Rokich, R. 306, Addendum 3, compel this 
Court to reverse the trial court's dismissal. 
A. Conduct of Both Parties 
On June 9, 1993, the Court entered a Scheduling Order setting 
the trial for January 4, 1994. R. 92. The Scheduling Order 
required Plaintiffs to designate their expert witnesses by August 
31, 1993 and lay witnesses by September 30, 1993. Id. Plaintiffs 
submitted their expert witness list on August 31, 1993, R. 98, and 
lay witness list on September 30, 1993. R. 103. The Scheduling 
Order required the Defendants to file their expert and lay witness 
list on September 30, 1993. R. 92. Defendants failed to file any 
list of witnesses. 
In October, 1993, Plaintiffs conducted discovery in record 
depositions, R. 105, served Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents on Defendants, R. 107, and prepared the 
case for trial. In November, 1993, Plaintiffs moved to amend their 
Complaint in order to simplify and focus the issues. At the 
November 30, 1993 Pretrial Hearing, Judge Rokich continued the 
trial at the request of the Defendants and with the consent of the 
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parties, agreeing that this was the proper determination. R. 306-
7, Addendum 3. In December, 1993, Plaintiffs answered Defendants' 
Second Set of Interrogatories. R. 175. 
Defendants failed to participate in the action by failing to 
designate their witnesses or answer Plaintiffs' discovery. At the 
status hearing in September, 1994, both parties and Judge Rokich 
agreed to continue the status hearing without date after Defendants 
indicated a likely change of counsel. On learning that a change of 
counsel was anticipated, Judge Rokich felt ". . .it would be 
inappropriate to enter a scheduling order when counsel for 
Defendants was changing." Affidavit of Judge John A. Rokich, ^ 6, 
R. 306, Addendum 3. Judge Rokich did not intend to schedule the 
case for trial until substitute counsel for Defendants had been 
designated. Id. Plaintiffs' counsel relied on Judge Rokich's 
scheduling rulings and awaited the notice of appearance of new 
counsel. 
Defendants' new counsel simultaneously filed a Notice of 
Appearance of Counsel and a Motion to Dismiss on June 2, 1995. The 
filing of the Motion to Dismiss completely disregarded Judge 
Rokich's rulings on scheduling. The delay created between the 
scheduling hearing in September, 1994, and the May, 1995, Motion to 
Dismiss was entirely due to the Defendants' failure to name 
substitute counsel. Plaintiffs' reliance on Judge Rokich's rulings 
was reasonable. The Plaintiffs should not loose their cause of 
action because they relied on the rulings of the court. The 
dismissal penalizes Plaintiffs for complying with Judge Rokich's 
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ruling to allow the entry of new counsel before entering a 
scheduling order. This Court should defer to the rulings of Judge 
Rokich to allow the scheduling order to be entered and give the 
parties their day in court. 
The Supreme Court disfavors the ambush approach of Defendants 
in their filing of the Motion to Dismiss. In Johnson v. Firebrand, 
Inc., 571 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1977), the Court stated: 
The conduct of the parties cannot be readily 
explained, and in view of the fact that new counsel 
caused the case to be activated, it seems that the court 
abused its discretion in dismissing the case on a motion 
to dismiss that was filed at the same time as the answer. 
Although Plaintiffs' case has been pending for some time, the 
latest delay was directly caused by Defendants' failure to name 
replacement counsel. In following Judge Rokich's scheduling 
ruling, Plaintiffs could not move the case forward until 
Defendants' replacement counsel had been named. As a result, it is 
an abuse of discretion for the court to dismiss Plaintiffs' cause 
of action when the motion to dismiss was filed at the same time as 
the Notice of Appearance of Counsel. 
Defendants caused the delay. They failed to designate 
witnesses and failed to participate in discovery by failing to 
answer Plaintiffs' discovery requests. They requested the trial be 
continued. They failed to replace their counsel for several 
months. When Defendants finally named substitute counsel, he filed 
the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute in defiance of Judge 
Rokich's ruling. R. 305-6. The conduct of Defendants was to delay 
and to deceive. The conduct of the Plaintiffs was to cooperate and 
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to move the case forward. The case should not be dismissed when 
virtually every action to move the case forward was accomplished by 
the Plaintiffs. 
B. The Opportunity of Each Party to Move the Case Forward 
Both parties had the opportunity to move the case forward. 
Only Plaintiffs, however, actually moved the case forward by 
conducting discovery, designating expert and lay witnesses, 
responding to Defendants7 discovery, taking records depositions, 
issuing Subpoenas Duces Tecum, and focusing the issues with a 
Motion to Amend the Complaint. Defendants had the same 
opportunity, but failed to name witnesses or respond to Plaintiffs' 
discovery. In fact, it appears that Defendants intentionally tried 
to delay the proceedings by seeking to continue the trial, 
substitute counsel, obtaining a ruling from Judge Rokich that the 
case would not proceed until new counsel was designated, waiting 
nine months to name replacement counsel, and filing a Motion to 
Dismiss at the same time as replacement counsel was named. Both 
parties had the opportunity to go forward, but only Plaintiffs 
moved the case forward, while Defendants sought only to delay. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that when all 
litigants have the power to pursue and advance an action, it is 
error to dismiss with prejudice the claim of either party. The 
Court stated: 
. . . [T]his court has . . . held that where all of the 
litigants had power to obtain relief and failed to do so, 
it is error to dismiss with prejudice. None of the 
defendants requested a re-setting of either a pre-trial 
conference or trial as was mandated by the court 
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previously when the pre-trial was suspended by reason of 
settlement negotiations. 
Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977). 
Defendants did not request a pretrial conference or trial, but 
sought to continue the trial and suspend the proceedings in order 
to name substitute counsel. Since the parties had the power to 
obtain relief, it was error to dismiss Plaintiffs cause of action 
with prejudice. 
The complaining party's lack of diligence in moving the case 
forward also precludes the dismissal. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated in Westinghouse Electric Supply v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1977): 
[W] e are not impressed that the defendants 
themselves were overly diligent or manifest any 
particular haste in getting the pretrial discovery 
procedures completed and on with the trial. 
The Supreme Court also stated: 
. . . The important fact is that the defendant himself 
did nothing to move the case forward, but appears to have 
been quite contented to let it lie dormant until it was 
reactivated by the plaintiff. 
In accord with the view of the trial court, we are 
not impressed with either fairness or propriety in one 
party sitting silently by for a long period of time, then 
attempting to blame the other party for the delay .... 
Department of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 
(1980) . 
[I]t is obvious that plaintiffs' lack of 
diligence in prosecuting over 16 months was reasonably 
excusable in light of the settlement efforts and had 
defendants been anxious to proceed they need only have 
taken such affirmative step themselves. Also, no 
prejudice to defendants' position is evident while 
serious injustice may well exist as result of the 
dismissal. 
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Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977). The 
Plaintiffs' delay is reasonably excusable in light of Defendants' 
continuance of the trial, their representation that substitute 
counsel would be named and Judge Rokich's ruling that no action be 
taken in the case until replacement counsel is named. Affidavit of 
Judge Rokich, 1 6, R. 307. The delay of Defendants in continuing 
the trial and naming substitute counsel caused an eighteen month 
delay in the proceedings, November 30, 1993 to May, 1995. If 
Defendants were so intent on moving the case forward, they could 
have taken affirmative steps themselves by requesting a trial 
setting, designating witnesses, and answering discovery. Because 
the Defendants failed to take any constructive step to advance the 
case forward, it was error for the trial court to dismiss 
Plaintiffs' action with prejudice. 
Defendants had the opportunity to move the case forward. They 
might not have moved to strike the January 4, 1994 trial date at 
the November 30, 1993 pretrial. They might have named their 
substitute counsel immediately instead of waiting nine months, from 
the scheduling conference in September, 1994 until filing the 
Motion to Dismiss in May, 1995. Defendants might easily have 
responded to the outstanding discovery instead of prolonging the 
proceedings by neglecting to respond. Defendants might have 
designated their witnesses and prepared for trial. They did not. 
Defendants agreed to or exclusively caused an eighteen month delay 
between November, 1993, when the trial date was stricken, and May, 
1995, when Defendants filed the Motion to Dismiss. Defendants were 
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content to allow time to pass and then use the passage of time to 
condemn the Plaintiffs and seek a dismissal. 
C. What Each Party Did to Move the Case Forward 
Plaintiffs moved this case forward by naming their witnesses, 
issuing Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, 
answering Defendants' Interrogatories, conducting records 
depositions, serving Subpoenas Duces Tecum, and seeking to amend 
the Complaint. Defendants took no steps to name their witnesses or 
respond to Plaintiffs' discovery. Defendants failed to name their 
substitute counsel as promised at the September, 1994 status 
conference until the Motion to Dismiss was filed in May, 1995. 
With the exception of the deposition of Michael Strand, Plaintiffs 
were prepared to try the case. Plaintiffs have documentation of 
Defendants' malpractice, for which sanctions were imposed by the 
State Division of Licensing. That documentation does not grow 
stale, as the Defendants allege, nor do the records of the State 
relating to its sanction and suspension of Defendants for their 
acts. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is error to 
dismiss an action with prejudice when all litigants had the 
opportunity to move the case forward but failed to do so. Utah Oil 
Co. v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1977); Westincrhouse 
Electric Supply v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 
879 (Utah 1977); Department of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 
1323, 1324 (1980) . In Crystal Lime & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 8 Utah 
2d 389, 393, 335 P.2d 624 (1959), the case was dormant from June 5, 
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1950 until May 28, 1958, when a motion to dismiss for lack of 
prosecution was filed. The Court stated: 
. . . Since any party to this action could have 
obtained the relief to which it was entitled at any time 
it wanted but both parties chose to dally for a number of 
years, it is an abuse of discretion for the court to 
grant respondents' motion to dismiss with prejudice. 
See also, Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977) . 
Since both parties had an opportunity to move the case forward, it 
is an abuse of discretion for this action to be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
When the court makes a ruling, it is reasonable for the 
parties to rely on that ruling without risking a dismissal of their 
claims. In Polk v. Ivers, 561 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Utah 1977), the 
Supreme Court set aside a dismissal for failure to prosecute 
because the parties failed to receive notice of the new trial date. 
The Court stated: 
We conclude, after a review of the entire record in 
this matter, including the District Court's failure to 
notify the attorneys of the new trial date after the 
hearing on December 15, 1975, that it was an abuse of 
discretion to order a dismissal of this action for 
failure to prosecute when measured by the principles 
announced in Westinghouse v. Larsen, . . . . 
In the case at bar, the court did not contribute to the delay, but 
ruled that no further proceedings would take place before 
Defendants named their new counsel. Plaintiffs complied with the 
court's ruling and took no further action until Defendants named 
their counsel. When naming their attorney, Defendants also filed 
the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The grant of that 
motion constitutes an abuse of discretion under the totality of the 
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circumstances, the justifiable excuse of Plaintiffs, and the 
principles set forth in Westinghouse. 
D. What Difficulty or Prejudice was Caused to Defendants 
Defendants7 only allegation of difficulty or prejudice 
resulting from the delay in bringing this action to trial is that 
the issues are "stale" and that witnesses cannot be found. 
Defendants have never explained the actual effect, if any, of their 
conclusion that the issues were "stale". Likewise, Defendants 
never named the witnesses they sought but could not find. 
Defendants have failed to disclose any of their witnesses, despite 
the court order requiring disclosure. Their claim that some 
witnesses cannot be found, therefore, seems particularly hollow. 
The difficulty or prejudice alleged by Defendants is 
unsubstantiated and without foundation. Defendants have simply not 
been prejudiced or injured as a result of any delays which are, in 
fact, a direct result of the Defendants' own acts. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Klincrer v. Kicrhtly. 791 P. 2d 868 
Utah 1990), analyzed the issue of staleness and balanced it against 
the potential prejudice to the parties. The Court stated: 
as signor on the survey certificate he is 
responsible for its content, is still actively engaged in 
the practice of surveying, and is available for 
testimony. 
Utilizing the balancing test and being conscious of 
the purposes of the statute of limitations, we hold that 
under the facts of this case the evidence is not so stale 
or remote as to outweigh the prejudice to defendants of 
having their claim barred by the statute of limitations. 
Id. at 872. See also, Sevey v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629 
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(Utah 1995) . While this case admittedly deals with the statute of 
limitations, its analysis of the "staleness" issue is useful. 
Those responsible for the accounting product are still actively 
involved in the accounting industry and are available to testify. 
When this Court compares the dismissal's prejudicial effect on 
Plaintiffs in contrast to the hardship or prejudice to Defendants, 
the Plaintiffs' claim is not so stale and remote as to justify the 
dismissal. 
E. Whether Injustice will Result from the Dismissal 
The Utah Supreme Court called the last consideration in the 
Westincrhouse test the "most important": whether injustice may 
result from the dismissal. Plaintiffs clearly suffer injustice as 
a result of the Court's decision. Plaintiffs have a valid and 
valuable cause of action which is lost with the dismissal. 
Plaintiffs will never have their day in court to air their 
grievances nor recover damages for the intentional malpractice of 
Defendants. Plaintiffs are prejudiced because they reasonably 
relied, to their detriment, on the rulings of Judge Rokich and the 
agreements of the Defendants and the Court to continue the case 
without a trial setting. Plaintiffs are also prejudiced because 
they lose their substantial investment of time and attorney's fees 
in this cause of action and their injuries caused at the hands of 
Defendants' malpractice will go uncompensated. 
Injustice will result not only to Plaintiffs, who lose a sound 
and valuable cause of action, but also to Plaintiffs' counsel, who 
faces a claim of malpractice due to the dismissal. Was it 
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malpractice for Plaintiff's counsel to rely on the rulings of Judge 
Rokich and agreements with Defendants to continue the case without 
a trial setting? Was it unreasonable for Plaintiffs' counsel to 
rely on the representations that Defense counsel would be 
substituted and that until the substitution, it was inappropriate 
to set a trial date? Was it a breach of the standard of care for 
Plaintiff's counsel to fail to schedule the out of town deposition 
of Michael Strand before Defendants had named the attorney who 
would represent them at trial? In a time when the Courts and the 
Bar stress the need for civility between the parties, is it 
unreasonable for Plaintiffs' counsel to seek to accommodate Defense 
counsel in relation to the scheduling? The Court's dismissal of 
this action flies in the face of civility and cooperation. And 
now, because of new counsel and a new court, Plaintiffs may loose 
their cause of action because their counsel relied on those 
policies and the expressed rulings of Judge Rokich. This is 
unfair, a harsh result without warning, and contrary to the 
principles of civility and judicial discretion. 
The law abhors a forfeiture. The Utah Supreme Court in Madsen 
v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44 (Utah 1983), has stated: 
. . . The undesirability of such a result is well-stated 
by the legal maxim that "the law abhors forfeiture." 
E.g., SAS Partnership v. Schafer, Mont., 653 P.2d 834, 
837 (1982); Eisele v. Kowal, 11 Ariz. App. 468, 471, 465 
P.2d 605, 608 (1970). 
Because forfeitures are usually harsh, we have 
disfavored them in cases where the notice to the buyer of 
the impending forfeiture is uncertain as to the 
performance demanded, or misleads the buyer into thinking 
that the forfeiture provision will not be strictly 
enforced. See First Security Bank v. Maxwell, Utah, 659 
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P.2d 1078 (1983) ; Grow v. Marwick Development. Inc. , 
Utah, 621 P.2d 1249 (1980) . Cf. Wincrets, Inc. v. 
Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972) (terms of 
the forfeiture provision must be clear and unambiguous). 
The decision of the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs7 Complaint, 
with prejudice, constitutes a forfeiture without reasonable notice. 
Similar to the situation in Madsen, Plaintiffs7 counsel did not 
know of an impending risk of dismissal or forfeiture of the cause 
of action because of the rulings of Judge Rokich and the agreements 
between the parties and the Court. Plaintiffs were active in 
preparing for trial and had all the preparations completed with the 
exception of the deposition of Michael Strand and the documents 
requested from Defendants. 
Forfeitures are harsh. Dismissals are harsh. It is 
appropriate that short of dismissing the action completely, 
especially in light of the injustice to Plaintiffs and their 
counsel, that the trial court consider other options to move the 
case forward and remedy Defendants7 alleged prejudice and 
difficulty. The trial court could have set a strict schedule and 
expedited the trial. The court could have ordered that Plaintiffs 
bear the expense of locating witnesses which Defendants claim are 
"lost". But in light of Judge Rokich7s ruling and the agreements 
of the parties, totally dismissing Plaintiffs7 Complaint with 
prejudice is unduly harsh and an abuse of discretion. 
Plaintiffs simply seek to have this Court recognize and 
embrace the higher priority in the use of its discretion, to afford 
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between 
them. Justice requires that the Court reinstate Plaintiffs7 cause 
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of action and allow the case to be heard on the merits. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Westincrhouse Electric Supply 
v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1977): 
. . . it is indeed commendable to handle cases with 
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in order 
to keep them up to date. But it is even more important 
to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence of 
courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard 
and to do justice between them. In conformity with that 
principle the courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default judgment where there is any 
reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial 
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party. 
It is our conclusion that the trial court failed to 
give proper weight to the higher priority; and that under 
the circumstances described herein, the order of 
dismissal (with prejudice) was an abuse of discretion. 
[Emphasis added]. 
Although the trial court sought to relieve its calendar of an old 
case, it ignored the previous rulings of the court, the relative 
positions of the parties, the delay caused by Defendants, and the 
prejudice wrought on Plaintiffs by dismissing their cause of 
action. The record reflects no prejudice or injustice which 
reversing the dismissal would impose on Defendants. The trial 
court has failed to give the proper weight to the higher priority 
of allowing cases to be heard and determined on their merits. The 
dismissal, therefore, should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
Due process is a constitutionally guaranteed protection, 
affording not only notice and an opportunity for hearing, but also 
requiring judges to consider relevant factors in reaching their 
decisions, to protect against arbitrary and capricious decisions 
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that abuse discretion. The trial court failed to consider the 
Westinghouse factors in making its decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' 
cause of action with prejudice, but focused exclusively on 
Plaintiffs' actions. The failure to consider the relevant factors 
in reaching a decision is an abuse of discretion. Having failed to 
consider the relevant factors in making its decision, the trial 
court violated Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. Based 
on that violation, the case should be reversed and remanded to the 
trial court. 
The Westinghouse requirements must be considered by the court 
before ruling on a motion to dismiss. In addition to the five 
considerations set forth in Westinghouse, it also requires a 
11
 justifiable excuse11 for the delay. Plaintiffs' justification for 
the delay is Defendants' request to continue the trial and Judge 
Rokich's ruling that no action would be taken in relation to the 
case until Defendants' substitute counsel was named, coupled with 
Defendants' nine month delay in naming that counsel. Defendants, 
therefore, directly caused or consented to delays of over eighteen 
months. The Defendants' actions constitute the justifiable excuse 
for the actions of Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs adhered to the court's scheduling order by 
designating its witnesses. Defendants never named any witnesses. 
Plaintiffs conducted discovery, held records depositions, issued 
subpoenas duces tecum, and filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to 
move the case forward. Defendants did nothing to move the case 
forward and now complain of the delay they created. The totality 
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of the circumstances justify the reversal of the dismissal and 
remand to the trial court. 
DATED this £$ day of April, 1996. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to Michael L. Deamer, 139 East South Temple #330, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169, postage prepaid, this $0 day 
of April, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Leland Martineau and 
Martineau & Company 
139 East South Temple, #330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
Fax: (801) 531-0444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND and LOIS L. ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
STRAND, PREJUDICE 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
: Civil No. 810905200-CV 
LELAND MARTINEAU, et al. 
: Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendants. 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law concurrentiy entered herewith 
and good cause appearing, now, therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss with prejudice and on the merits be and the same is hereby granted and the above-
entitled action, including the Amended Complaint and all causes of action, be and the same are 
FtttBBlST8tCTG888T 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2 3 1995 
SAL! tAKcdQti&TY 
By ^ 
Deputy Clerk 
0 0 0 3 2 : 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, each party to bear its own attorneys' fees, 
court costs and expenses. 
Plaintiffs Motions to Strike Answer and Enter Default Judgment and to Strike the 
Affidavit of Leland Martineau are hereby denied. 
Octets 
DATED this <Jday of Auguat, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable William B. Bohling 
District Court Judge • 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Ralph C. Petty 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE, this ^ f day of August, 1995, postage prepaid, and re-
served following consideration of Plaintiffs' objections on the following: 
Ralph C. Petty 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
I; lh'M'£^^ 
34sbmid 6490 
*1 0 0 3 '2 3 
ADDENDUM 2 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Leland Martineau and 
Martineau & Company 
139 East South Temple, #330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169 
Telephone: (801) 531-0441 
Fax: (801) 531-0444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND and LOIS L. : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
STRAND, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
: Civil No. 810905200-CV 
LELAND MARTINEAU, et al. 
: Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendants. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and Plaintiffs' Motions to Strike 
Answer and Enter Default Judgment and to Strike Affidavit of Leland Martineau came on for 
hearing before the above-entitled court pursuant to notice before the Honorable William B. 
Bohling at his courtroom in Salt Lake City, Utah on Monday, August 14, 1995 with Ralph C. 
Petty appearing on behalf of Plaintiffs and Michael L. Deamer appearing on behalf of 
HLEDBlS1BtCTC8»RT 
TWid Judicial District 
OCT 2 3 1995 
By ———•* Iy Deputy Clerk 
a o o 3 1 ? 
Defendants and the court having heard argument of counsel, having reviewed the 
memorandums of law and affidavits and being fully advised in the premises, now enters its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs' action was originally filed in June of 1981. Plaintiffs' Complaint has 
been amended at least once but the matter is not presently certified for trial nor has the court 
set a date for trial. 
2. Except for status conferences, the last action taken in this matter was in 
December of 1993. 
3. Plaintiffs claim that they have outstanding discovery requests filed in 
approximately October of 1993 which Defendants deny. Plaintiffs have not filed a motion to 
compel discovery or taken any other action regarding the outstanding discovery requests. 
4. Defendants have denied the material allegations of Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint by Affidavit and there has been no counter-affidavit filed by Plaintiffs in response 
thereto. 
5. Plaintiffs have not met their burden to go forward with the litigation and certify 
the matter for trial within a reasonable period of time. 
6. Plaintiff Michael Strand is presently in a Texas penitentiary and will be for a few 
more years and, therefore, is unable to be present for any trial of the above-entitled matter. 
7. It appears to the court that the issues are stale, witnesses cannot be identified, 
and it would be in the best interest of justice to dismiss the above-entitled action with prejudice 
on the merits under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2 
A r. f\ a •* c 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs have not met their burden to prosecute the above-entitled action with 
due diligence and without unusual or unreasonable delay. 
2. Plaintiffs have not, with reasonable diligence, pursued their outstanding 
discovery requests. 
3. The Affidavit of Leland Martineau set forth upon information and belief is 
sufficient under Rule 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and shall not be stricken. 
4. Plaintiffs' failure to pursue litigation that has been pending for over 14 years 
with no action except for status conferences taken on the matter since December of 1993 is 
sufficient basis for dismissal of the above-entitled action with prejudice on the merits, pursuant 
to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. No attorneys' fees and costs are awarded. 
6. Defendants' Motion should be granted and Plaintiffs' Motions denied. 
Oc43u 
DATED this C£_ day of Augustr 1995. 
COURT: 
Honorable William B. Bohling 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Ralph C. Petty 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, this ^3^~ay of August, 1995, postage prepaid, 
and re-served following consideration of Plaintiffs'objections on the following: 
Ralph C. Petty 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
34sbmld.6489 
!s.' 
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ADDENDUM 3 
Affidavit of Judge John A. Rokich 
" c v . c i v t u A U S i J 3 1295 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-6686 
RECEIVhO AUG 2 
n • ^ v 
FILED 
1995 
<U< 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL D I S T R I c t ^ ^ H T OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND, et al. , 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LELAND MARTINEAU, et al. , 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A, ROKICH 
IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE DISMISSAL AND 
REINSTATE PLAINTIFF'S ACTION 
Case No. 810905200CV 
Judge William 3. Bohling 
) 
) ss 
County of Tooele 
State of Utah } 
John A, Rokich, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is a member of the Utah Bar in good standing. 
2. Affiant is familiar with and has personal knowledge of the 
statements set forth in this Affidavit. 
3. Affiant was the judge assigned to the above entitled 
matter when it came before Affiant pursuant to a scheduling 
conference, on September 17, 1994. 
4. Affiant is competent to testify, and if called to testify, 
his testimony would establish the facts averred in this Affidavit. 
5. At the September 17, 1994 scheduling conference between 
the Court and the above mentioned parties, Defendants' counsel, 
Roger Sandack, indicated that he would be replaced by subsequent 
counsel and would not be the attorney representing the defendants 
a ft a s n fi 
at the time of trial. 
6, Based on the disclosures of Mr. Sandack, and the consent 
of Mr. Petty, Affiant determined that it would be inappropriate to 
enter a scheduling order when counsel for Defendants was changing. 
Affiant intended to set a schedule for the completion of this 
action after Defendants' new counsel had been designated. Affiant 
intended to take no further action in relation to this case until 
substitute counsel for Defendants was designated. 
7. A trial had been scheduled in this case for January, 1994. 
At a pretrial hearing for the trial, the parties, with Affiant's 
consent, agreed to continue the trial, without date. 
DATED this c\ P day of August, 1995. 
-AviC 
\Johri. A. Rokich V 
Subscribed and sworn before me this OiO day of August, 
1995. - -
C 5 ;
 fiipuA cjatomtou 
j
 r , 
I N - ^ Apn; 1,19^7 j Notary Publi<f/ residina at 
L . ^ ^ - - « J t t £ i i X ! l 1 Tooele, Utah / 
My^ommission Expires: I sgf^ - ^ N S S M S J N " 1 
« ' ^ April 1,1997 | 
MAILING CERTIFICATE L J^^«___«^J*JWah__J 
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to Michael L. Deamer, 139 East South Temple # 330, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this ,)£f day of 
August, 1995. 
o o o:] o 7 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Notice of Appeal 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
215 South State, # 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-8900 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-6686 
r 
•• :j l 
FILED __ 
r - - r o P;; 2:59 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LELAND MARTINEAU, et al. , 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 810905200CV 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, through 
its attorneys appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment 
of Judge William B. Bohling, entered in this matter on October 23, 
1995. 
DATED this day of November, 1995. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to Michael L. Deamer, 139 East South Temple #330, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169, postage prepaid, this day 
of November, 1995. 
